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The coronaviruses have inflicted health and societal crises in recent decades. Both
SARS CoV-1 and 2 are suspected to spread through outdoor routes in high-density
cities, infecting residents in apartments on separate floors or in different buildings in
many superspreading events, often in the absence of close personal contact. The
viability of such mode of transmission is disputed in the research literature, and
there is little evidence on the dose–response relationship at the apartment level. This
paper describes a study to examine the viability of outdoor airborne transmission
between neighboring apartments in high density cities. A first-principles model, airborne
transmission via outdoor route (ATOR), was developed to simulate airborne pathogen
generation, natural decay, outdoor dispersion, apartment entry, and inhalation exposure
of susceptible persons in neighboring apartments. The model was partially evaluated
using a smoke tracer experiment in a mock-up high-density city site and cross-checking
using the computational fluid dynamics (CFD) models. The ATOR model was used to
retrospectively investigate the relationship between viral exposure and disease infection
at an apartment level in two superspreading events in Hong Kong: the SARS outbreak in
Amoy Gardens and the COVID-19 outbreak in Luk Chuen House. Logistic regression
results suggested that the predicted viral exposure was positively correlated with
the probability of disease infection at apartment level for both events. Infection risks
associated with the outdoor route transmission of SARS can be reduced to <10%, if the
quanta emission rate from the primary patient is below 30 q/h. Compared with the indoor
route transmission, the outdoor route can better explain patterns of disease infection. A
viral plume can spread upward and downward, driven by buoyancy forces, while also
dispersing under natural wind. Fan-assistant natural ventilation in residential buildings
may increase infection risks. Findings have implication for public health response to
current and future pandemics and the ATOR model can serve as planning and design
tool to identify the risk of airborne disease transmission in high-density cities.
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INTRODUCTION
The coronaviruses, a group of RNA viruses of zoonotic origin
(Woo et al., 2010), have inflicted global health and societal
damages in recent decades. Examples include the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) caused by SARS-CoV-1 (DoH,
2003), the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) caused
by MERS-CoV (WHO, 2019), and the most recent Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic caused by SARS-CoV-
2 (WHO, 2020a). The coronaviruses are believed to spread
primarily through close contact with virus-laden respiratory
droplets among people in close distances (DoH, 2019) or through
direct contact or indirect fomites, although fomite is considered
less common, and few cases of fomite transmission have been
reported (Goldman, 2020).
Research evidence is emerging on airborne transmission
of coronaviruses, in which viral pathogens spread via droplet
nuclei, the dried residua of larger respiratory droplets (Wells,
1955), alternatively known as microdroplets (WHO, 2020b) or
aerosols (CDC, 2020). Fine droplet nuclei equal or smaller
than 5µm in size (WHO, 2020b) are capable of suspending
in the air and can travel over relatively long distances,
although the actual size threshold is disputed (Siegel et al.,
2007). Airborne SARS-CoV-2 viral copies were found in
hospitals in Wuhan, China (Liu et al., 2020), and viable ones
were found in aerosol samples meters away from COVID-19
patients (Lednicky et al., 2020). Mechanistic studies of particle
dynamics suggest that airborne transmission is the dominant
mode in near-field transmission of COVID-19 (Chen et al.,
2020). The WHO initially dismissed airborne transmission of
COVID-19 as a major mode of transmission (WHO, 2020b).
It reconsidered in October 2020, after receiving petitions
from 200+ research scientists (Morawska and Milton, 2020),
acknowledging that “more studies are underway to better
understand the conditions in which aerosol transmission is
occurring” (WHO, 2020c).
Mitigation of coronavirus transmission is of particular
urgency in high-density cities, where a growing number of
COVID-19 superspreading events are found in and between
high-rise residential buildings (FHB, 2020). Disease spread
between neighboring apartments, often among residents who do
not know each other (Ting, 2020). The airborne transmission
of coronaviruses via the outdoor route is suspected to have
played a role in these superspreading events in high-density
cities. A well-cited event is the SARS outbreak in Amoy Gardens,
Hong Kong, where large numbers of infections were reported
from apartments on various floor levels of high-rise buildings
and in different buildings, all traced epidemiologically to a
common source without explicit evidence of personal contact or
fomite transmission (SARS Expert Committee, 2003). Medical
evidence suggested the nasopharyngeal viral load in patients
upon hospitalization correlated inversely with distance from
the apartment of the primary patient, suspecting airborne
transmission played an important role (Chu et al., 2005).
Evidence from numerical studies pointed at the same direction:
a virus-laden plume exhausts into the reentrant space and then
rises upward and spreads to other apartments in the block and
to other buildings by prevailing wind and wake flow (Yu et al.,
2004).
The feasibility of airborne transmission of coronaviruses via
the outdoor route is disputed in the scientific community. A
widely held view considers that virus-laden aerosols are quickly
diluted in the outdoor air, or lose their virulence under sunlight
(Ratnesar-Shumate et al., 2020) and are therefore unable to
initiate or sustain infections. A majority of researchers support
airborne transmission via the indoor route, which is known
to spread air pollutants such as cigarette smoke to other
apartments inside multiunit residences (Kraev et al., 2009).
SARS virus-laden aerosols were suspected to have infiltrated
between apartments in Block E of Amoy Gardens through
the elevator shaft, stair cases, the gaps of doors (Li et al.,
2005) and via the external building reentrant space, a narrow
semi-outdoor space for the placement of air conditioning (AC)
condensing units (Li et al., 2006). Other investigations suggest
that flawed drainage systems, particularly the dried up U-traps
connected to the floor drains in bathrooms might have lost
the sealing functions, allowing contaminated fecal aerosols to
enter the bathrooms from sewage pipes, driven by vertical
pressure in high-rise buildings (SARS Expert Committee, 2003).
Fecal aerosols through drainage systems are also suspected to
have played a role in the vertical transmission of COVID-
19 between apartments in a high-rise building in Guangzhou
(Kang et al., 2020). Most of the simulation literature does not
discuss the viral exposure achievable via airborne transmission
through an outdoor route. Further studies are therefore needed
that integrate methods from both engineering and medical
literatures, such as first-principles numerical simulation and
viral infectious dose, in order to gain a better understanding
of the “apartment to apartment” external airborne transmission
of coronaviruses, especially in high-density cities. Mitigation of
coronavirus transmission is of a particular importance in high-
density cities, with higher numbers of infected cases reported
(Kadi and Khelfaoui, 2020) and outbreaks often take place earlier
than other types of settlement (Carozzi et al., 2020).
This paper describes a study to examine the infection
risk of outdoor airborne transmission between neighboring
apartments in high-density cities. A first-principles simulation
model, the airborne transmission via outdoor route (ATOR),
has been developed to assess the airborne pathogen generation
from primary cases: indoors, natural decay, outdoor dispersion,
apartment entry, and inhalation exposure at apartment level.
Predicted results were partially evaluated using a smoke tracer
experiment conducted in a mock-up site with concrete bins
mimicking 1:50 scale buildings. Particulate Matter <1µm in
size (PM1) were used as proxies for virus-laden droplet nuclei
and compared with ATOR simulation results. Computational
fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations were also compared with
the ATOR predictions. Using two cases of COVID-19 and
SARS outbreaks in Hong Kong, the ATOR model was used to
analyze retrospectively the viral exposure in apartments. The
CFD simulation was also carried out for the two cases and
compared to the ATOR predictions. The relationship between
disease infection and predicted viral exposure was analyzed using
the logistic regression. Comparisons were made between the
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outdoor and indoor route transmission in explaining patterns of
disease infection.
Results from this study can enhance our understanding of
the transmission mode during superspreading events, identifying
built environment characteristics, which offer protective factors,
and informing public health responses and the design and
operation of high-density cities.
RELEVANT WORK
Numerical simulations have been used to study airborne
pathogen transmission in urban environments. The most
commonly used tool is the CFD simulation (Ferziger and Perić,
2002) with various turbulence models and dispersion modules
for passive scalar, such as water vapor, chemical pollutants, and
aerosol particles.
Another body of literature, referred to as “urban canyon
models,” focuses on microscale air pollutant dispersion within
street canyons (Forehead and Huynh, 2018). Zonal airflow
network models, initially developed to assess indoor energy and
air mass transfer (Chen and Li, 2002; ASHRAE, 2009), have
been adapted to consider outdoor urban sites (Yao et al., 2011;
Liang et al., 2018). Many simulation software packages have
been developed with varying performance levels of precision,
scale, and computational cost. Examples include Fluent, Airpak
(ANSYS, 2020), PHAST (Witlox et al., 2018), the Quick Urban
& Industrial Complex Dispersion Modeling System (QUIC)
(Brown et al., 2016), the urban dispersion model SIRANE
(Soulhac et al., 2017), the Operational Street Pollution Model
(OSPM) (Kakosimos et al., 2010), CT-Analyst (Leitl et al.,
2016), etc. Field measurement studies have been conducted to
evaluate the performance of the above-mentioned numerical
simulation models. Hanna and Chang (2015) measured tracer
gas concentration in Manhattan, NY and found good agreement
between measurement and predicted results using various
numerical models.
Research literature remains inconclusive over the mode of
coronavirus transmission between apartments in high-density
cities. A conventional view considers disease spreading through
the drainage systems, such is the case of the COVID-19 infection
that occurred in a high-rise building in Guangzhou (Kang
et al., 2020) and the SARS outbreak in Amoy Gardens (DoH,
2003). Viral aerosols are suspected to spread via drainage pipes
inside buildings due to backpressure in the system and the
use of bathroom exhaust fans, yet simulated results appear to
disagree with the infection patterns (Li et al., 2006). Hwang et al.
(2021) suspected the transmission of COVID-19 in a high-rise
apartment building in Seoul, South Korea through a vertical air
duct in the bathrooms, in which viral aerosols spread upward
and downward through the air duct by the stack effect (Hwang
et al., 2021). Niu and Tung (2008) considered the vertical spread
of viral aerosols through windows in high-rise buildings, as both
simulated results, and tracer gas experiment suggested that the
exhaust air from an apartment on the lower floor can rise and
enter into the one above. Animals have been suspected to have
spread disease, such as ferrets, cats, dogs for COVID-19 (Shi et al.,
2020), and mice for SARS (Wentworth et al., 2004), though these
views are not widely shared. Airborne transmission via indoor
and outdoor spaces has been suspected (Yu et al., 2004), while
definitive evidence is rare.
Knowledge on airborne transmission of coronaviruses is
still emerging. Two significant research gaps exist. First, it
is unknown whether ATOR can deliver the viral exposure
needed to initiate infections. The numerical simulation literature
focuses on the prediction of particle trajectories, the airflow
streamlines (Tsou, 2003), the dilution factors of bio-aerosols
(Yu et al., 2004), patterns of plume transmission (Li et al.,
2006), and air pollutant concentration (Li et al., 2005).
There are no estimates on the inhalation viral exposure for
susceptible persons, which may occur over an extended period
of time. Second, the dose–response relationship during the
apartment-to-apartment disease transmission events is poorly
understood. There are no guidelines or public health response
to mitigate apartment-to-apartment transmission risks in high-
density cities. More studies are therefore needed to estimate the
viral exposure and to establish the dose–response relationship of
coronavirus ATOR.
METHODS
A first-principles simulation model, the ATOR, has been
developed to assess the infection risk of coronaviruses in high-
density cities. The model combines (1) the first-principles
simulation of CFD and zonal airflow network model to assess
the viral quanta concentration from one apartment to another
via the outdoor environment, and (2) the Wells–Riley (WR;
Riley et al., 1978; Nardell, 2016) equation, which predicts the
probability of infection as an exponential function of inhalation
dose. Smoke tracer experiments were conducted in a mock-
up high-density city site to partially evaluate the performance
of the ATOR model in predicting the concentration of PM1.
Two superspreading events of the coronaviruses in Hong Kong
were retrospectively analyzed at the apartment level. Finally,
the logistic regression analysis was used to determine the
patterns of disease infection in relationship to the predicted
viral exposure.
Simulating Airborne Transmission via
Outdoor Route
The ATOR model was developed to quantitatively assess the
pathogen generation, dispersion, natural decay, and inhalation
exposure in a high-density city. A schematic depiction of the
ATOR model is provided in Figure 1. The input data are
the location and quantity of viral shedding from the primary
patient(s), 3D urban and building geometries, weather conditions
(wind speed and direction), and anthropogenic heat in the source
apartment from occupants and small power equipment. The
outputs are concentrations of infectious release per unit volume
of air in the neighborhood, inside apartments, and the inhalation
dose by susceptible persons in neighboring apartments. First-
principle models, such as the Windows version of the CFD
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FIGURE 1 | A conceptual framework of airborne transmission of coronavirus consisting of pathogen generation, natural decay, outdoor dispersion, and apartment
entry.
software AIR (WinAIR) (Jones et al., 2013) and a zonal airflow
networkmodel (Liang et al., 2018), were included as components.
Steady-state conditions are assumed, and the infectious release
is assumed to be instantaneously and uniformly mixed in the
emission zone.
Pathogen Generation
The WR approach was adopted, which uses the concept of
“quanta” to measure the airborne spread of disease infection.
One quantum is defined as the minimum dose of inhaled
airborne organisms necessary to cause infection (Nardell, 2016).
The WR approach is suitable for this study, since the precise
rate of viral shedding from patients and the minimum number
of infectious viral particles required to initiate new infections
is unknown for coronaviruses. Instead of committing to an
assumed number of viral copies or particles shed by a primary
patient, the WR approach allows for quantitative assessment
of the viral exposure for a susceptible population, while tacitly
accounting for factors associated with viral decays under the
stress of aerosolization, and dehydration. The WR equation
can also be used to reversely estimate the source emission
rate and the quanta concentration, if the disease infection
patterns, length of exposure, and the pulmonary ventilation
rate of individuals are known. In this study, the source quanta
emission rate of an infected person is denoted as (qvt0 ), with the
unit of quanta per hour (q/h). Instead of using an estimated
value from existing literature, the qvt0 is backcalculated using
disease infection patterns (see the Appendix). In other words,
we predict back from all secondary infections and obtain a
value of the viral exposure needed to initiate new infections,
we then establish the source quanta emission rate needed to
achieve the viral exposure at secondary infection cases. The
backcalculated source quanta emission rate is then checked
against the literature.
Pathogen Decay
It refers to the decrease of infectious viral copies in time. The rate
of decay is subject to ambient temperature, humidity (Pyankov
et al., 2018; Mecenas et al., 2020), and sunlight (Ratnesar-
Shumate et al., 2020). The decay function is expressed in
Equation 1. For a volume of infectious release at the time ti, the
viral quantity (qvtn ) is estimated as a function of the viral quantity
(qvtn−1 ) at the previous time step (tn−1), the time lag between the
two (1t), and the airborne viral survival rate kd in accordance










where kd for both SARS-CoV-1 and SARS-CoV-2 has been
estimated at −6.94 × 10−5 (quanta/m3 s) or −0.25 (quanta/m3
h) according to van Doremalen et al. (2020).
Outdoor Dispersion
The airborne viral concentration in a volume of outdoor air
is a function of the viral decay and dilution during airborne
transmission. In accordance with the WR approach, a zonal
approach has been taken, assuming a small zone i of well-mixed
air, with J number of neighboring zones to its downwind as the
virus sink, and K number of neighboring zones to its upwind as
the virus source. The airborne viral concentration for zone i at a
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where qvi is the quantity of newly added pathogens from an
infectious person to zone i; Vi and ρi are the volume and
density of air in zone i; Cvin−1 and C
v
jn−1
are the airborne viral
concentration for zone i and j at the previous time step tn−1; 1t
is a small time lag between tn and tn−1; Fi,j is the outgoing airflow
from zone i to j; Fk,i is the incoming airflow from zone k to i; and
ρk is the density of air at zone k. The calculation of Fi,j, Fj,i, ρi,
and ρk is specified in the air and energy flow simulation module
as given below.
A zonal airflow network model (Liang et al., 2018; Huang
et al., 2020) has been used to predict wind and buoyancy-driven
airflow in the urban canopy Layer in high-density cities. The
model domain consists of a network of “zones.” The volume of air
and droplet nuclei within each zone is considered well-mixed in
accordance with theWR approach. Interzonal airflow is assumed
to be driven by pressure, temperature, and density differences.
The model considers the exhaust fans and anthropogenic heat
sources discharged from apartments into the ambient air. The
model domain is joined by external boundaries from above, the
east, south, west, and north. The vertical wind speed profile
is input as a boundary condition. Zonal temperature, pressure,
and airflow conditions are solved using mass continuity, energy
conservation, and pressure balance equations.
The Pressure Balance and Mass Continuity
The volume of air in each zone is assumed to have a uniform
temperature (Ti) and density (ρi). The zonal air pressure (P
e
i ) at




i − ρigHe (3), where
Pci is the air pressure at the geometric center of the zone i, g is the
gravitational acceleration, andHe is the vertical distance from the
zone center. Pressure, temperature, and density observe the ideal
gas law ρi = Pi/Rair Ti (4) (Rair is the gas constant for air). The
airflow rate Fij from zone i to neighboring zone j is a function of
pressure and density differences at the border and characteristics














Fi,j = 0 (6)




Fi,j = 0 (7)
since mass changes caused by density difference is
often negligible.
The Energy Conservation
The energy conservation equation for the body of air within
zone i is expressed in Equation 8, which describes heat transfer
from airflows to and from neighboring zones, thermal massing,
and anthropogenic heat generation, i.e., traffic and heating,



















where A is the number of active heat sources within zone i, q
gen
a
and λ are the power and operational coefficient of each active
heat source; Fij and Fji are the airflow rates between zone i and
neighboring zone j; J is the number of neighboring zones; and
CP and Vi are the specific heat capacity and volume of the zonal
air. Steady-state simulations were performed using the ATOR
model in this study, and due to the variability of solar angle and
radiation intensity, solar heat gains at building surfaces are not
accounted for in this study.
Apartment Entry
The virus-laden fine particles will find their way from apartment
to apartment through natural infiltration and forced ventilation
where exhaust fans are used. The infiltration rates vary from
apartment to apartment, depending on air leakage factors, i.e.,
opening windows, and ambient wind conditions. A simplified












where the value of I/O has been estimated to be 0.7, referring
to studies by Dockery and Spengler (1981). A Hong Kong study
found the average I/O ratio is 0.8 for fine particles and 0.6 for
NOx (Chan, 2002).
Inhalation Exposure
The inhaled dose of airborne virus is estimated as a function of
quanta concentration in the ambient air, the length of exposure,
and the pulmonary ventilation rate of individuals, as it is








where qve is the inhaled viral quanta; Te is the duration of
exposure; Tb the duration of breath under normal respiration
rate, estimated at 1 breath in every 4 s; and VT is the tidal volume
per breath, estimated at 500 cc (5 × 10−4 m3) in reference to the
EPA exposure factors handbook (2011).
The risk of disease infection at apartment level (P) is estimated
using the WR equation (Riley et al., 1978), in which P is a
probability function of inhaled infectious viral quanta (qve) as it
is shown in Equation 11 below:
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Smoke Tracer Experiment in Mock-Up
High-Density City
The ATOR model was evaluated using smoke tracer experiments
conducted on a mock-up site. The site mimics an array of high-
rise high-density buildings at 1:50 scale. Fine particles smaller
than 1µm (PM1) were generated using a smoke tracer as a
proxy for virus-laden droplet nuclei. The PM1 concentration was
measured using particle mass spectrometers and compared with
simulated results.
Mock-Up Site
A mock-up high-density city consisted of some 3,000 concrete
bins that were built on a university campus in Guangzhou, China
(23◦4′ N and 113◦23′ E). Each concrete bin, measuring at 0.5, 0.5,
and 1.2m in width, length, and height, respectively, resembles
a high-rise building at 1:50 scale. The height of a concrete bin
mimics a 20–25 story residential building, which represents the
average housing stock in Hong Kong consisted of a mixture of 8–
12 story apartments in older districts and 40+ story ones in newer
districts (Chau et al., 2007). The concrete bins were placed in
an unobstructed rectangular field facing north–south, separated
from each other by mock-up street canyons of 0.5m in width
(Figure 2).
Experiment Procedure
Smoke was generated near ground level from the burning of
smoke cakes consisting of sulfur (40% by mass), sawdust (20%
by mass), and desiccants (CaCl2, 40% by mass). The combustion
was contained in a perforated metal chamber, allowing mixing of
aerosols within the chamber before being released (Figure 2B).
The experiment was carried out on a sunny partially cloudy day
during December 9, 2017. Eachmeasurement scenario took place
within small time segments of 20 s, during which the ambient
wind condition and smoke concentration were relatively stable,
in accordance with the steady-state assumption used in the ATOR
model. Recordings were made using a video camera during the
experiment for recording keeping.
Equipment
The concentration of PM1 was measured using 18 sets of particle
mass spectrometers placed to the downwind direction from the
source (Figure 2C), each consists of a particle photometer (OPC-
N2 sensor, Alphasense Ltd., Great Notley, Essex, UK) measuring
light scattered by individual particles carried in a sample air
stream through a laser beam (Alphasense, 2015). Results were
used to estimate mass concentration of PM1. The sensors have
been evaluated extensively in the research literature (Sousan
et al., 2016; Mukherjee et al., 2017). Temperature, humidity,
and wind speed were measured using the Kestrel 4,500 Weather
Meter sensors Kestrel, Boothwyn, PA, USA. To account for heat
gains from surfaces, the temperature of concrete bin surfaces
(roof, east, south, west, and north façade) and the ground were
measured using the Thermal Couples (EQ-TC-K-Cali-24S), TE
Wire &Cable LLC, Saddle Brook, NJ, USA attached to the Agilent
34972A data logger, Agilient, Santa Clara, CA, USA. The ambient
temperature, humidity, wind speed, and direction were measured
using the HOBOWeather Station, Onset Computer Corporation,
Bourne, MA, USA placed at the periphery of the site. Two sets of
particle mass spectrometers were also placed at the site border
upwind from the smoke tracer experiment in order to measure
the ambient particular matter concentration.
A cross-checking of the ATOR model was also conducted
using the WINAIR CFD simulation software (Jones et al., 2013).
It is a relatively simple CFD model based on a Cartesian
grid, which can simulate the concentration of pollutants as
a scalar, and it uses a fixed viscosity turbulence model for
outdoor simulations.
Predicting Infectious Bioaerosol
Transmission in Coronavirus Outbreaks
The ATOR model was used to assess airborne transmission
of coronaviruses via the outdoor route in two superspreading
events in Hong Kong: the SARS outbreak in Amoy Gardens
and the COVID-19 outbreak in the Luk Chuen House. In both
events, disease transmission was reported between apartments
on different floor levels or between buildings, in the absence
of definitive evidence of personal contact, fomite, or fecal
transmission routes.
Logistic regression analysis was used to determine the
strength of correlation between probability of disease infection
and predicted viral exposure. The dependent variable was
the binary infection (1 = someone in the apartment was
infected and 0 = none). The independent variable was
the predicted inhalation viral exposure estimated for each
apartment using the ATOR model. The unit of analysis is
each apartment, in order to exclude higher order infections,
in this case, one potential secondary case per apartment if
there is more than one occupant in an apartment. The built
environment attributes of disease outbreak venue, the chain of
disease transmission, and the setup of simulation inputs are
specified below:
SARS Outbreak in the Amoy Gardens, Hong Kong
A well-cited superspreading event occurred in Amoy Gardens
Phase I (淘大花园一期), a high-density private housing estate
located in Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong (Tsou, 2003). A total of
321 infected cases from 142 apartments were diagnosed with
SARS between March 21 and April 15, 2003. The Phase I
of Amoy Gardens consists of residential towers (Blocks A–
H), each measuring 105m high with 33 residential floors
situated on top of a three-level high podium of commercial
uses (Figure 3A). The towers were of the cruciform shape,
each arm of the cruciform containing two apartments, with
eight flats on each floor sharing the staircase and elevators
(Figure 3B).
The chain of infections is shown in Figure 3C. The primary
patient visited Apt.7 on 16/F in Block E from March 14 to
19, 2003 (Riley et al., 2003; Li et al., 2005). The length of
exposure can be assumed to be within a 5-day period. A
total of 52 other apartments (64 individuals) had diagnosed
SARS cases on or before March 24, 2003, within the 5-day
incubation period for SARS (Lessler et al., 2009; DoH, 2019),
which can be considered as secondary infections directly linked
to the primary case. Infection cases after March 24, marked
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FIGURE 2 | (A) The mock-up high-density city site and the smoke tracer experiment layout; (B) a screenshot of a video taken during the smoke tracer experiment,
with the metal combustion chamber with smoke cake inside; (C) deployment of particle mass spectrometer; and (D) deployment of thermal couples on the concrete
bin façade, roof, and the ground.
FIGURE 3 | (A) Configuration of the Amoy Gardens Phase I during the 2003 SARS outbreak; (B) a typical building floor plan for Amoy Gardens (SARS Expert
Committee, 2003); and (C) a summary of SARS infection cases by date of symptom onset in Amoy Gardens, Hong Kong.
in gray color in Figure 3C, may be secondary or higher-order
infections. Disease infection data were acquired from published
studies (Li et al., 2006). Infected cases were epidemiologically
linked to a primary patient who then stayed in Apt.7, 16/F
in Block E (SARS Expert Committee, 2003). The government
committee suspected that the disease spread primarily via the
sewage system, close personal contact, and shared communal
facilities such as lifts and staircases (DoH, 2003), while research
literature suggested that the airborne transmission of both
outdoor route (Yu et al., 2004) and indoor route (Li et al., 2005)
was also possible.
Data from several sources were used to set up the ATOR
simulation. The 3D building dataset were obtained from the
Lands Department (2016). The prevailing wind in March 2003,
measured by the Hong Kong Observatory, was mostly East-
Southeast (110◦ from north) with average wind speed of 3.6
m/s at a reference height of 16m (Tsou, 2003). The ambient
air temperature was mostly in the mild range of 14–17◦C
during the outbreak (Li et al., 2005), therefore precluding
the use of AC units. A mechanical exhaust fan was used
by the primary patient during the outbreak (DoH, 2003),
estimated with 7.7 W of power output and air volume flow
rate (qr) of 0.21 m
3/s. The anthropogenic heat generation rate
from the apartment was estimated at 440 W for small power
equipment, for the assumed three-person household of 40 m2 in
floor area.
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COVID-19 Outbreak in the Luk Chuen House
A COVID-19 outbreak took place in the Luk Chuen House
(祿泉樓), a 16-floor public housing estate in Shatin District
of Hong Kong. A total of nine patients were diagnosed with
COVID-19 from May 31 to June 13, 2020 (DoH, 2020). The
building has an elongated double-loaded floor plan with 40
apartments arranged on each floor, separated by a corridor
(Figure 4a). Each apartment consists of three rooms: the living
room is connected to the corridor; the toilet and kitchen are
located on the other side, with window-mounted exhaust fans
used for ventilation. Each apartment measure between 29.2 and
32.5 m2 in floor area and was occupied mostly by a two-person
household due to its small size (Figure 4b).
The chain of COVID-19 infections is shown in Figure 4c.
Most of the infected apartments were stacked vertically on
top of each other (HKHAD, 2020). The primary patient, a
woman residing in Apt.812, was diagnosed with COVID-19 and
hospitalized on May 31, 2020 together with her husband (Tsang
and Chan, 2020). Infections spread to four other apartments
(Apts.710, 811, 1,012, and 1,112) before June 4, and two more
apartments (Apts.810 and 812) on June 12. The infectious
disease expert Yuen Kwok-yung of Hong Kong visited the
site and found the exhaust fans mounted in the bathroom
and kitchen were used by the primary patient during the
disease transmission. He suspected that ATOR played a role
in the outbreak, whereas the transmission of fecal aerosol
through compromised floor drain was unlikely due to the
building configuration (ON.CC, 2020). This study included
five out of the six infected apartments, except for Apt.811
located across from the corridor from the primary case, which
might have been caused by the indoor transmission. The
timeline of disease infection in residing apartments was verified
from multiple news media sources and from the Hong Kong
government database (CHP, 2020). For the assumed two-
person occupancy in each apartment, the length of exposure
for secondary infections was estimated to be 5 days between
May 26 and 31. The primary patients may have contracted
the virus as early as May 26, 2020 and remained infectious
before hospitalization during the incubation period of COVID-
19, estimated at 5 days on average (Lauer et al., 2020; Li et al.,
2020).
Weather conditions during the outbreak were recorded at
the Sha Tin automatic weather station (N 22◦24′09′′ and
E 114◦12′36′′), 1.5 km from the Luk Chuen House. The
meteorological record at 10-min interval between May 26 and
31, 2020 was obtained from the Hong Kong Observatory and
plotted in Figure 5. The weather condition had been hot and
humid, AC units were probably used intermittently. In the
absence of a detailed AC usage schedule, it was assumed that
AC was used when the ambient air temperature exceeded
29.5◦C, a threshold established empirically by Kwok et al.
(2017) for households of Hong Kong. The indoor room
temperature was assumed to be 2◦C lower than the outdoor
temperature when AC units were in use. The ambient wind
speed was mostly in the range of 1–3 m/s, with period
of low wind conditions (<1 m/s), usually in the evening
hours between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. the next day, during which
buoyancy airflow likely has dominated over external wind.
For this reason, we assumed a no- wind condition for the
simulation model.
The 3D building dataset including contextual information,
dimensions, and floor plans were acquired from the Lands
Department (2016) and the Hong Kong Housing Authority
(HKIA, 2019). Parameters for exhaust fans were estimated from
the label to be 7.7 W of power output and air volume of 0.21
m3/s. The anthropogenic heat generation from the apartment
was estimated at 220 W, or 7.5 W/m2 for the estimated size of
the apartment based on a two-person household.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results are presented as follows: (1) evaluation of the ATOR
model using the smoke tracer experiment; (2) comparison of
predicted results using CFD andATOR for Luk Chuen and Amoy
Gardens; and (3) simulation of Amoy Gardens using ATOR and
comparison with infected people.
Evaluation of the ATOR Model Using the
Smoke Tracer Experiment
For the smoke tracer experiment, a reasonably good agreement
was found between measured aerosol concentration and levels
predicted using ATOR. The predicted and measured PM1
concentrations on a logarithmic scale are presented in Figure 6A.
The root mean square error (RMSE) is 105.94 µg/m3 and the
Pearson’s r correlation is 0.88. The simulated PM1 concentration
using the CFD model (WINAIR) agreed reasonably well ATOR
(Figure 6B). A visualization of the predicted PM1 concentration
is shown in Figure 6C. The pollutants appear to have dispersed
under natural wind, while spreading upward driven by the
buoyancy forces.
Comparison of Predicted Results Using
CFD and ATOR for Amoy Gardens and Luk
Chuen House
Simulations of viral quanta concentration in outdoor spaces
were carried out using the ATOR model and CFD, and the
results compared. For Amoy Gardens, the simulated viral plume
spread under natural wind is shown in Figure 7A, which is in
reasonable agreement with those of the CFD model WINAIR
(Figure 7B). In both figures, the predicted viral plume disperses
upward and downward, driven by buoyancy forces and the wind
wake effects created by high-rise buildings. Airborne viruses
discharged from an apartment might be captured in wake or
street canyon circulations influenced by the configuration of
buildings and wind patterns. These circulation patterns might
limit the dispersion and lead to elevated concentrations at the
boundary of the building, both above and below the apartment
where the viruses emanate. The airflow through multiple high-
rise buildings tends to create pockets of negative pressure in the
wake of obstructing buildings.
A more detailed ATOR simulation was conducted based on a
refined model geometry, including the reentrance space between
Apt.7 and Apt.8, the narrow gap between the cruciform-shaped
building footprint. Results were shown in Figure 8A. The refined
model was able to predict the rise of viral plume in the reentrance
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FIGURE 4 | (a) An axiomatic view of the Luk Chuen House in its urban context (Source: Google Map); (b) the floorplan of the Luk Chuen House consisting of an
elongated rectangular block with the location of the primary case; and (c) a summary of COVID-19 infection cases marked on a cross section, color-coded by date of
symptom onset in Luk Chuen House, Hong Kong.
FIGURE 5 | A summary of ambient air temperature, relative humidity, and wind speed measured at the Sha Tin Automatic Weather Station between May 26 and 31,
2020.
space between Apt.7 and Apt.8 in Block E. Also, the ATOR
model was able to predict the vertical and horizontal spread
of viral plumes in the community. The buoyancy force was
found to have contributed to the upward vertical dispersion
of viral aerosols. Without such force, the viral plume appears
to disperse windward by the north-easterly wind, spreading
horizontally, and downward with a very minimum proportion
traveling upward (Figure 8B).
For the Luk Chuen House, the predicted airflow pattern and
pollutant concentration using both CFD and the ATOR model
are compared with each other in Figure 9. Both models predicted
the virus-laden plume rising upwards from the apartment of
the primary patients, driven by buoyancy force (Figures 9A,B).
When the AC is in use, which is assumed to be a third of the
hours during the 5-day period, the plume from the primary case
apartment tends to travel to the lower floors as the relatively
cool exhaust air falls due to negative buoyancy (Figure 9C). A
time-weighted average value is computed for the mean viral
concentration for computing inhalation exposure. The weighting
is based on the assumption that the AC unit was in use during
one-fifth of the 5-day period, when the ambient air temperature
was above 29.5◦C, the empirically determined threshold for AC
use in Hong Kong (Kwok et al., 2017).
Disease Infection Pattern and Predicted
Viral Exposure
The correlations between predicted viral exposure at apartment
level and patterns of disease infections were analyzed for both
SARS outbreak in Amoy Gardens and the COVID-19 outbreak
in Luk Chuen House.
SARS: Amoy Gardens
The predicted viral inhalation exposure correlates positively with
patterns of the SARS infections at an apartment level. The logistic
regression results of the SARS infection and predicted viral
inhalation exposure are presented in Table 1. The results are
statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level. The odds
ratio for viral exposure is 3.017 (95% CI: 2.303, 3.732). The odds
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FIGURE 6 | (A) Predicted and measured PM1 concentration during the smoke tracer experiment; (B) planar view of predicted PM1 concentration for Scenario 2 at the
height of 0.9m above ground by the CFD model (WINAIR) and the ATOR model; and (C) visualization of the predicted PM1 concentration using the ATOR model
under various wind direction and speed during the smoke tracer experiment.
FIGURE 7 | Cross-sectional view of the predicted quanta concentration using (A) ATOR and (B) WINAIR in Amoy Gardens, Hong Kong during the SARS outbreak in
2003.
ratio for the intercept stands low at−2.441, suggesting a low risk
factor when the predicted viral exposure is zero.
A consistency check was conducted for infection cases by
the building and possible higher-order infections occurred
after secondary infections. Logistic regression results is shown
in Table 2 for all four buildings (Blocks B–E) and Block E,
respectively. The dependent variable was the SARS infection
in apartments (binary), the independent variables were the
predicted viral exposure (quanta) and the dummy variable of
indoor route transmission, an indicator of whether an apartment
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FIGURE 8 | (A) Predicted quanta concentration in Amoy Gardens, Hong Kong during the SARS outbreak in 2003 using ATOR including the reentrance space
between Apt.7 and Apt.8 in Block E in the model domain and (B) simulated vial air load concentration without buoyancy force, in which the viral plume bend
downward by the “wake effect.”
FIGURE 9 | (A) Simulated viral quanta concentration using ATOR without air conditioning (AC) usage; (B) simulated air pollutant plume using WINAIR without AC
usage; and (C) simulated air pollutant plume using WINAIR with the AC unit in use in the primary patient’s apartment.
is in the same building with the primary patient (1 = yes). It was
found that the predicted viral exposure was positively associated
with the SARS infection in all four buildings (p < 0.001) and
in Block B (p < 0.001) with consistently high odds ratio. Also,
being in the same building with the primary patient inflicts an
additional risk of the SARS infection (p < 0.001), suggesting that
intra-building transmission played a role in spreading disease
infections. Consistent results are obtained for the regression
analysis for a subset of 52 apartments (62 infected individuals)
with early symptom onset on or before March.24, within 5 days
of the disease incubation period, which is less likely to be tertiary
or higher-order infections, details are included in Table A2 in
the Appendix.
COVID-19: Luk Chuen House
The predicted viral exposure correlates positively with patterns
of disease infection in other apartments using a logarithmic
scale. Logistic regression results for COVID-19 infection
cases and predicted viral exposure are presented in Table 3.
The odds ratio for viral exposure is at 135.6 (95% CI:
3.950, 4,654.214), suggesting that the correlation between the
predicted exposure and patterns of infection is statistically
significant at 99% confidence level. The quanta values were
backcalculated based on the quanta emission rates needed to
inflict patterns of secondary infections shown in the Appendix.
However, given the relatively small number of infected cases
recorded in the COVID-19 outbreak in the Luk Chuen
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House, the above-mentioned findings should be interpreted
with caution. Further studies such as the tracer gas experiment
and additional evidence from other superspreading events
are needed.
Discussion
The airborne transmission of coronaviruses via the outdoor route
could be a significant risk for residents in high-density cities.
The viral exposure, a function of viral concentration, length of
exposure, and pulmonary ventilation rate expressed by Equation
10, is shown as the blue line in Figure 10. The constant one
quantum exposure is shown in the rectangular hyperbola curve.
Exposure to a low viral concentration for a long period of time,
in the order of days such as it may occur in a high-density
residential neighborhood, can equate a short exposure to a high
viral concentration as it was reported in studies on short-range
airborne route (Chen et al., 2020) and airborne indoor route
transmission (Miller et al., 2020).
No current public health practices respond to ATOR.Wearing
face masks is practiced in public spaces yet rare at home, and
lockdown measures can actually increase the length of exposure
TABLE 1 | Logistic regression of the diagnosed SARS infection vs. predicted viral
exposure at apartment level, all four buildings (Blocks B–E).
Logistic regression N 1,056
LR Chi2(1) 71.03
Prob > Chi2 0.000
Log likelihood −342.453
Pseudo R2 0.094
Infection Odds ratio P > z [95% Conf. Interval]
Viral exposure (quanta) 3.017 0.000*** 2.303 3.732
Intercept −2.441 0.000*** −2.671 −2.210
***99.9% Confidence level.
for susceptible persons to virus-laden aerosols dispersed in
the immediate neighborhood. Enhancing indoor air ventilation,
commonly advised by public health guidelines, can increase the
exposure to the infiltration of virus-contaminated droplet nuclei
from nearby.
The source quanta emission rate qvt0 was backcalculated based
on the patterns of disease infection. For the COVID-19 outbreak
in the Luk Chuen House, qvt0 was estimated in the order of 60
q/h, which is comparable with findings from existing literature,
ranging from 4.9 to 31 for speaking (Buonanno et al., 2020a), 460
(Prentiss et al., 2020) to 970 (Miller et al., 2020) in superspreading
events. For the SARS outbreak in Amoy Gardens, qvt0 was around
680 q/h, which was higher than estimates from a limited available
study on SARS (Liao et al., 2005) yet within the range of estimates
from the COVID-19 literature.
The close proximity of apartments to each other can elevate
the infection risks, especially in the presence of superspreaders,
i.e., primary patients with high quanta emission rates. Estimation
of predicted infection risks in other apartments under various
quanta emission rates from the primary patient are presented
in the boxplot in Figure 11. Under the scenario of toilet
aerosolization (quanta emission rate = 680 q/h), Apts 7 and 8
TABLE 3 | Regressing COVID-19 infection on the predicted viral exposure in the
Luk Chuen House.
Logistic regression N 98
LR chi2(1) 7.06
Prob > chi2 0.008
Log likelihood = −13.180 Pseudo R2 0.211
COVID19 infection Odds ratio P > z [95% Conf. Interval]
Viral exposure (quanta) 135.580 0.007*** 3.950 4,654.214
Intercept 0.014 0.000*** 0.003 0.076
***99% Confidence level.
TABLE 2 | Logistic regression of the diagnosed SARS infection in apartments vs. predicted viral exposure by building.
All buildings Block E Block C Block B
N 1,056 264 264 264
LR chi2(1) 95.97 42.88 22.06 2.20
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.138
Pseudo R2 0.127 0.147 0.146 0.016
Log likelihood −329.980 −137.741 −64.695 −69.728
Infection Odds ratio (p-value) Odds ratio (p-value) Odds ratio (p-value) Odds ratio (p-value)
Viral exposure (quanta) 1.846 (0.001)*** 1.917 (0.001)*** 11.323 (0.001)*** 9.079(0.123)
Indoor route 2.992 (0.001)*** n.a. n.a. n.a.
Intercept 0.064 (0.001)*** 0.186 (0.001)*** 0.035 (0.001)*** 0.058 (0.000)***
***99.9% Confidence level.
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FIGURE 10 | Modes of coronavirus transmission by viral concentration and length of exposure. The area of a rectangle is one quantum, the minimum dose of inhaled
airborne organisms necessary to cause infection.
in Block E above the apartment where viruses were emanating
have predicted risk of disease infection (P) above 50% (maximum
at 70%), whereas there are some 30 apartments with predicted
risk factors above 20%. Under the scenario in which qvt0 = 100
q/h, referring to the choir outbreak of COVID-19 in which the
primary patient was singing during light activities (Buonanno
et al., 2020b), the maximum predicted risk is at 26%, whereas
eight apartments have predicted risk factors above 10%. When
qvt0 reduces to below 30 q/h, such as q
v
t0
= 28 q/h for SARS in a
hospital setting according to Liao et al. (2005), or qvt0 = 4.9 q/h
estimated for COVID-19 patients speaking during light activities
according to Buonanno et al. (2020a), there are no predicted
infection risks in other apartments above 10%.
The outdoor route transmission theory can explain patterns of
disease infection that supplement, while not replacing, the well-
established intra-building transmission theory. A virtualization
of the predicted quanta concentration via the outdoor route
in apartments is shown in Figure 12A. Predictions by the
indoor route model, a detailed multizone airflow network
model to assess air pollutant dispersion developed by Li
et al. (2005), is shown in Figure 12B. Patterns of disease
infection are shown in Figure 12C. Both the outdoor and
indoor route models have predicted the airborne transmission
driven by wind and buoyance, though predictions from the
indoor route model cannot account for infection cases in
the lower floors (4–13/F), but the outdoor route model can
predict the downward dispersion of viral aerosols induced by
the “wake effect.”
A statistical comparison between the outdoor and indoor
route theories for the SARS outbreak in Amoy Gardens is
provided in Figures 12D,E. The Y-axis is the SARS infection
rate of apartments, aggregated for the lower (4–13/F), middle
(14–23/F) and upper (24–36/F) proportions of Block E by Yu
et al. (2004). The X-axis is the predicted quanta concentration
from the outdoor or indoor route. The outdoor route results
were predicted using the ATORmodel (Figure 12D). The indoor
model results are from Li et al. (2005) using a detailed multizone
model for indoor airborne transmission (Figure 12E). Specifics
of the indoor route transmission have been included in the
Appendix. The outdoor route model appears to offer a better
explanation, with a slightly higher R2-value (0.92) compared with
the indoor route model (0.79). To supplement the above finding
based on a dearth of three points, a detailed comparison was
made between the indoor and outdoor model based on values
aggregated by apartments of the same number (#1–8) for the
lower, middle, and upper proportion of Block E, as it is shown
in Figure A1 of the Appendix. Again, the outdoor route model
appears to have outperformed the indoor route model by having
a higher R2-value (outdoor 0.51 vs. indoor 0.27).
This study has several limitations. It has only accounted
for two superspreading events from one city. Although the
correlation between patterns of disease infection and predicted
viral concentration is statistically significant, more events should
be studied. Further, the ATOR model should be evaluated with
physical measurements in the ambient environment around
building, perhaps in conjunction with tracer studies. Currently,
our evaluation study covers a particular climate, notably low
wind speeds, high temperatures, and tall buildings (above 10
story) in a high-density city. For instance, the exhaust heat from
AC condenser was not modeled separately in this study, due to
the mild weather during the SARS outbreak in Amoy Gardens
and the relatively less common AC usage in public housing
estates such as the Luk Chuen House. The findings should not
be automatically extended to an alternative context of different
climate or building types. Some input parameters for the ATOR
model are based on empirical estimates, such as the viral airborne
survival rate kd, which can be further improved to account for the
impact of ambient air temperature, humidity, and solar radiation,
should more empirical evidence become available. Instead of
assuming an average source quanta emission rate during the
infectious period in this study, the model can be further adapted
to account for a varying source quanta emission rate, which is
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FIGURE 11 | A boxplot of predicted infection risks at apartment level with various quanta emission rates from the primary patient in the SARS outbreak in Amoy
Gardens.
found to increase toward the onset of symptoms and peak for
∼0.5–1.0 days (Goyal and Schiffer, 2020). Lastly, the influence of
solar radiation on surfaces has not been considered in this study.
We have adopted a steady-state approach in this study, which
makes it difficult to account for the time-varying solar angle and
radiation during the period of disease transmission.
The research has implications for the design and operation
of buildings and their ventilation systems. Mitigation measures
include adding air filtration devices to the exhaust fan, at the
fresh air inlet, a portable air filter, or even ultraviolet disinfection
devices placed in rooms. According to the WR equation in
Equation 6, an ordinary portable air filter capable of removing
60% of indoor fine particles (and the viral concentration) can
reduce the infection risk by a factor of 0.4–0.6. Air filters of
HVAC systems, typically capable of removing 90% of indoor
fine particles, can reduce the infection risk by a factor of 0.8–
0.9. Centralized AC and ventilation systems can add protective
effect by reducing the contribution of outdoor air pollutants to
the indoor environments (Dockery and Spengler, 1981), which
offers an advantage in both energy efficiency and health for
high-density cities.
Lessons can be drawn to urban design and planning of
high-density cities. Infection risks can be exacerbated by
the proximity of apartments from each other in a high-
density city. The use of fan-assistant natural ventilation can
increase disease infection risks. Airborne viruses discharged
from an apartment might be captured in wake or street
canyon circulations influenced by the configuration of buildings
and wind patterns. These circulation patterns might limit
dispersion and lead to elevated concentrations at the boundary
of the building both above and below the apartment where
viruses emanate. Findings illustrate that transmission of SARS
CoV-2 (and perhaps other infectious pathogens) might be
transmitted through the outdoor air when more common
transport and dilution is disrupted in a densely built-up
urban area.
The public health message to increase ventilation by opening
windows might not be universally useful, if it increases exposure
to airborne viruses. We cannot assume that the outside air is safe.
Unit air conditioners that rely on natural ventilationmay increase
transmission risk, and it may be beneficial to consider centralized
AC for high-rise residential buildings in replacement of the
existing fan-assisted natural infiltration. A centralized HVAC
system, which saves energy by recovering heat from exhaust air,
can also reduce disease transmission risks by drawing clean air
from a rooftop location and reducing, possibly with the addition
of filters, indoor air pollutants (and infectious pathogens) from
discharging to the surrounding neighborhoods.
CONCLUSION
Air flow around buildings has been simulated to test whether
it is feasible for the coronavirus transmission to occur between
the neighboring apartments via an outdoor route. The ATOR
model simulates the outdoor dispersion, transport, and reentry
to another apartment of viruses shed from an infectious person
living in the building. The model was applied to retrospectively
investigate the relationship between the viral exposure and
disease infection at the apartment level in two superspreading
events in Hong Kong. Results suggest that the predicted viral
exposure is positively correlated with the probability of disease
infection at the apartment level for both COVID-19 and
SARS-CoV-1. Infection risks associated with the outdoor route
transmission of SARS can be reduced significantly (<10%) if
the quanta emission rate from the primary patient is below 30
q/h. The outdoor dispersion patterns appear to roughly coincide
with the spatial distribution of infections. The results indicate
the strong probability of ATOR for the SARS outbreak in Amoy
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FIGURE 12 | (A) Predicted quanta concentration via the outdoor route using the ATOR model; (B) predicted air pollutant concentration via the indoor route using a
detailed multizone model by Li et al. (2005); (C) SARS diagnosis in Block E of Amoy Gardens at apartment level; (D) percentage of infected apartments in Block E of
Amoy Gardens vs. the predicted mean quanta concentration for the outdoor route model; and (E) the air pollutant concentration using the indoor route model (Li
et al., 2005, p. 22); values are aggregated by the lower, middle, and upper proportion of building.
Gardens, whereas the results for the COVID-19 outbreak in the
Luk Chuen House are not so well-established due to a small
number of infected cases. However, precautionary measures
should be taken to mitigate the risks associated with ATOR.
The ATORmodel can serve as a useful tool to predict infection
risks by buildings and apartments under the prevailing wind,
buoyancy, and mechanical ventilation conditions. Simulation
results tool can alert architects and planners of potential elevation
of airborne pathogens due to street canyon effect and wake effect
in the proposed development scheme and to inform necessary
distances between buildings and apartments and minimum
dilution factors needed to reduce risk levels. It can be further
developed into software tools to support design and operation of
buildings to mitigate risks of the current and future pandemics.
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List of Symbols.
Symbol Remark Unit
qvtn Airborne viral quantity at the current time step quanta
qvtn−1 Airborne viral quantity at the previous time step quanta
qve Inhaled viral quantity quanta
qvi Quantity of newly added pathogens from an infectious person to zone i quanta
kd Airborne viral survival rate quanta/m
3.h
qvt0 Source quanta emission rate of an infected person quanta/h
tn The current time step s
tn−1 Previous time step s
t Time lag between time step tn and tn−1 s
Tb Duration of breath under normal respiration rate s
Te Duration of exposure h
Φ Diameter of respiratory microdroplet µm
He Vertical distance from the center of zone i m
Aij Characteristics of the opening between zone i and j m
2
qr Volume flow rate of an exhaust fan m
3/s
Vi Volume of air in zone i m
3
VT Tidal volume per breath m
3
g Gravitational acceleration m/s2
Fi,j Outgoing airflow from zone i to j kg/s
Fk,i Incoming airflow from zone k to i kg/s
ρi Density of air in zone i kg/m
3
ρj Density of air in zone j kg/m
3
ρk Density of air in zone k kg/m
3





Airborne viral concentration in an apartment quanta/m3
Cvin The airborne viral concentration for zone i at the current time step tn quanta/m
3
Cvin−1 Airborne viral concentration for zone i at the previous time step tn−1 quanta/m
3
Cvkn−1 Airborne viral concentration for zone k at the previous time step tn−1 quanta/m
3
A Number of active heat sources within zone i count
J Number of neighboring zones to the downwind of zone i count
K Number of neighboring zones to the upwind of zone i count
Ti Air temperature for zone i K
Tj Air temperature for zone j K
Pei Zonal air pressure at a given height He Pa
Pci Air pressure at the geometric center of the zone i Pa
Cp Specific heat capacity for the zonal air J/kg·K
Rair Gas constant for air J/kg·K
q
gen
a Power of each active heat source W
λ Operational coefficient of each active heat source ratio
I/O Indoor and outdoor air pollutant ratio ratio
P Risk of disease infection at apartment level ratio
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